Emergence of the First Taxes

Abstract

Taxation has been considered by modern scholarship as inseparable from the existence of a state. This study is aimed at challenging this viewpoint by overviewing the history of taxation from the end of the prehistoric times until the end of the ancient times. By overviewing the historic development of the first taxation systems based upon historic documents and the literature on the history of taxation, it can be seen that in many cases taxation has preceded the conception of statehood in many cases. In fact, historic evidence shows that taxation is possible without the existence of a state, as other forms of community organisations also required some kind of wealth redistribution system to ensure the cooperation of the community members and to maintain order.

Keywords: ancient taxation, Neolithic era, cooperation, service, power, legal compliance
Jel: K34, N01, N40,

Introduction

This study previews the economic and social conditions for the introduction of prehistoric taxes, and its most important finding is that in some cultures, taxes were levied regularly even before the first states were established, i.e., the labour force of individuals was used for community purposes, part of the produce was taken away, the profits of trade and gift collection were skimmed, and with these tools the material foundations of transformation into a state were created. This practice of redistribution was made possible by the solidarity established in the Neolithic era and the balance of service and public contributions; principles on which the ancient states established later relied. Due to the fact that the study of taxation as a product of human culture dates back to times before writing was invented (Schumpeter, 1991), its early functioning can only be figured out from the archaeological remains of the societies that first levied taxes. Based on the artifacts put in their respective context, it can be concluded that civilizations that reached a similar level of development, in different forms and proportions, but in the same periods, reached the imposition of taxes and used the same financial instruments. Some communities in the proto-states of China, Mesopotamia and Europe and the Nile Valley, as well as various peoples of the Far East and Europe in the Bronze Age, reached such a level of economic and social development in the Neolithic period where they were able to levy taxes based on public works, implement larger-scale projects and collect crop taxes. Recognizing their own potential and using the balance of service and public contributions, these cultures were able to meet the defence, security, and food needs of their communities even in the absence of budget and bureaucracy, thus preparing and facilitating the emergence of writing, central administration and the formation of the first states.

The Intertwining Concepts of State and Taxation

The first question needs to be reviewed concerning the origins of taxation is whether the intertwining of taxation and the emergence of states was necessary, or could states exist without taxation or could human groups implement levies without state status? Researching the history of taxation, it can be concluded that the existence of states and the ability to tax were only seemingly linked, as large number of communities without state status, yet levying taxes can be found, while there have also been solid states playing a decisive in world politics that did not operate a tax system. Tribes, cities, and small kingdoms living in different periods of prehistory and antiquity were able to force human groups to pay taxes without a solid legal order and predictable financial management, such as the prehistoric principalities along the Nile, the cities of the Ubaid and Uruk periods, the Greek poleis, or the Warring Sates period in China. The taxation practices of these political units may be debatable, but it must be acknowledged that shortcomings to the functioning of their tax systems, such as the lack of taxpayer rights, norms and permanent administration, could be raised in whole or in part not only for prehistoric tax systems but also in terms of all tax systems operated up to the nineteenth century A.D. If the systems of redistribution operating in the Roman Empire or feudal states as tax systems are considered as tax systems, then these ancient types must also be regarded as such, because their imperfections are similar to those of any other model used before modern systems. The ability to tax in Neolithic societies meant, as in later times, that the community had the power to „confiscate” the resources necessary for its goals (Bonney, 1991). As soon as a community had surpluses of produce and labour in excess of its daily subsistence, its members jointly decided on how a part of the surplus or labour produced should be used for community purposes, and introduced taxation without establishing an omnipotent state, creating a government or a law enforcement organization. The unity of intention of the members of the community was sufficient, whereby they decided to create a protection or irrigation system with the manpower at their disposal, or to supply their sacral leaders with the surplus produce produced. Thus, the withdrawal of population resources, i.e., the driving force of redistribution, was made possible by the will of the group, i.e., the intertwining of public interest and individual interests. No open violence needed to be used in order for people living in the safety of the tribe or extended family to act in accordance with the will of the majority, because everyone was aware of the dangers of being outside the group and appreciated the benefits of cooperation, regular food supply, and internal and external security. In all advanced prehistoric groups, the development of taxation was facilitated by the establishment of bodies exercising power, such as councils of elders or land communities, tribal or village assemblies, which interpreted the concepts of customary law and determined the order of everyday life, as well as community goals and the means of obtaining or achieving them (Klengel, 1972: 112-115). These units continued to function after the creation of states. The old and privileged Mesopotamian cities were governed by a community of citizens, the People’s Assembly, in which all citizens with households participated, and its operation was governed by the elders (Oppenheim, 1977: 151-152). Hittite texts written centuries later often mention the elders of the settlements and village communities with independent responsibilities under the law of the empire, who were responsible for cultivating the lands and the work of their members (D’Alfonso-Matesi, 2021), and were obliged to look after lands abandoned by royal servants (D’Alfonso, 2010). These units of popular representation have become such an important part of human life that in many cultures, their functioning can be observed even after thousands of years. Roman assembly existed until the era of the Principate, the councils of the Egyptian and Indian land communities and the Slavic village communities continued to function even as late as in the nineteenth century A.D. and lost their importance only gradually.

Reviewing the other the issue from the opposite perspective, it can be seen that in the twentieth century A.D. modern and powerful states operated and managed without tax systems, as in the Soviet Union for seventy years from 1920 and in the former socialist countries between 1947 and 1990 there was no tax system, no tax offices and no tax laws. For different reasons, until 2018, some countries that rely on oil revenues, i.e., the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, did not impose taxes, and today some socialist countries such as North Korea and Cuba do not apply taxes for political reasons. It can be concluded that taxation itself is not a basic condition of statehood, because the redistribution of the wealth produced can take place according to different principles, as in the socialist-paternalistic states with the complete centralization of income, or through the voluntary donation of private wealth, as in the case of liturgy, in ancient Greek culture, or in the case of today’s Arab states relying on oil revenues. Since different forms of redistribution have developed throughout history, there is no reason to consider the concepts of state and taxation solely in conjunction with one another. If these legal institutions can be separated, i.e., taxation is not an immanent part of the functioning of the state, then it is possible that taxes were imposed before the first states came into being, and the economic and political conditions of this process must be reviewed.
The Impact of the Economic and Social Development of Ancient Communities on the Imposition of Public Works-Based Taxes:

Based on the research of archaeologists and historians, it can be established that the first taxes were levied in the period between the era of barbarism and the emergence of civilized states, when some groups of people began large-scale transformations of their environment. The tangible relics of this activity, i.e., the remains of chieftains’ tombs, shrines, storage pits, irrigation canals, can be explored, arranged chronologically whereby that the stratification, wealth, community goals of ancient communities and the order of redistribution of surplus crops can be concluded. In the VI-IV millennium BC, North Africa, the proto-states of China, Mesopotamia and Europe, and the II-I millennium BC. in some regions of Europe, China and India, competing settlements were established emerged among which centres of power emerged, where the population was able to build fortifications and cities, and to support crafts and trade (Renfrew-Bahn, 1996), as well as create conditions for more efficient agricultural production. In certain areas of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Anatolia, the VI-IV centuries BC. In the millennium BC, artificial irrigation systems were established and sacral buildings were erected relying on the abundant surplus of crops (Jursa-Garcia, 2015: 120). In just a few hundred years, early Egyptian cultures went from unadorned pit tombs of the leaders to the Naqada-era King Tomb of Abydos, whose rich grave goods illustrate expanding economic opportunities and the extent of community cooperation. Simple brick tombs were replaced first by ornate mastabas of the first pharaohs, while huge tombs were erected for rulers of the fourth and fifth dynasties, and Pharaoh Djoser used the resources of central power to build the first great pyramid (Clark, 1948: 129). The people of Jericho in the Middle East built a simple stone shrine in the 9th–8th millennium BC, but a few hundred years later, in the north-east of this region, the inhabitants of Çatalhöyük, Anatolia, becoming wealthy from cattle breeding and obsidian trade, erected an ornate shrine with plastered and painted walls covered with bas-reliefs. Mesopotamian cultures, growing strong in the 5th – 4th millennium BC, built temples layered upon one another, and their customary law required to preserve the remains of the previous sanctuary (Clark, 1975: 141-142). One of the most outstanding achievement of early Mesopotamian culture was the construction of the White Temple of Warka around 3200 BC, the walls of which were tiled with high-quality mosaics and the building was framed by a thirty-meter-wide colonnade

In parallel with the transformation of the environment, long before the formation of states, the development of social relations and administrative systems began. This is indicated by the fact that researchers in the Nile Valley have uncovered early king names that suggest that the unification of the empire began generations before the reign of Menes (Herzog, 1998), and that the Great Empire of Egypt was formed from two independent kingdoms, in which the former centres of power were loosely integrated into the imperial administration (Garcia, 2021: 291). It is known that in the proto-states of China, Mesopotamia and Europe, the cultural development of the territories belonging to present-day Syria reached a remarkable level of development before the establishment of the state, and the continuity of their culture can be traced back to prehistoric times (Klengel, 1967: 15). The first state in Babylon, according to historical sources, was founded in the 25th century BC by Eannatum of Lagash, whose successors did not eliminate the flourishing regional centers and relied on a system of previously independent cities (Jursa-Garcia, 2015:123). Each state formed in the Eastern Mediterranean centralized some of its local resources and formed larger political communities and took over the order and means of redistribution formed in the Neolithic era (Garfinkle, 2021). Peoples farming in a mixed or only rainfed agricultural system reached a political centralization and the higher-level use of surplus value only centuries later. The Phrygian kingdom of Anatolia, engaged in agriculture of mixed cultivation, began to build monumental public buildings, fortresses and tombs in the Bronze Age with the organized public work of the population (Marston, 2012). While some European communities were able to build megaliths, henges and tumuli as early as in the 5th- 4th millennium BC, in most parts of the continent massive fortifications and walled cities and richly elabourated tombs of kings were built in high number only in the 2nd-1st millennium BC. The development of the Chinese population started even more slowly, and excavations reveal that the Bronze-Age civilizations there were built on the economic foundations of the Neolithic era (Campbell, 2021: 41). It can be concluded that regardless of the national culture and geographical location, the basis for the development of all human groups was provided by the surplus of crops produced. According to Clark, the process of urbanization in Egypt was made possible by the increase in food reserves (Clark, 1948: 110-112). Childe believed that in Sumer, it was the Uruk period when enough economic surpluses were accumulated during to build temples, support priests, and supply raw materials to merchants and artisans (Childe, 1958: 94-95). The security of food supply soon led to the consolidation of the division of labour and personal property. This is indicated by the fact that in the sixth millennium BC houses in Choga Mami were always rebuilt within the boundaries of the plot, and the use of clay seals attesting property rights became widespread in many cultures (D’Alfonso-Matessi, 2021: 142-143).

It can be established that in the complex development process of human history, the establishment of states was only one of the most important stages, because people had already organized themselves into communities thousands of years earlier, created tools, learned about the functioning of local power and the power of group cooperation. When analysing this period, little attention has been paid to the development of taxation. Most experts accepted the incorrect statement at face value that taxation is as old as the state, because its creation required legislators, administration and the use of writing. Others insisted that the taxing function of the state is at least as old as state itself (Valk, 2021: 1). This idea is correct in that taxation developed together with human communities organized into states, however it fails to shed light on the issue that taxes existed before the emergence of states. If it is agreed that every element of a society, environment and culture has evolved steadily since the first human groups appeared, then it must be doubted that taxation and the state have emerged out of nowhere in an unusual and unprecedented way without any antecedent in different parts of the world. Archaeological evidence, grave goods, buildings, granaries, seal presses and evidence of long-distance trade testify to the fact that these two legal institutions under review developed gradually, parallel to changes in the material environment and production. The first taxes based on public works were levied in Neolithic communities where it was decided to implement projects that could not be realized through the voluntary work of members and had enough surplus food to feed the people involved in the work. It is known from the work of experimental archaeologists that the construction of a 70-metre mound of earth required 50 days of work by twenty people, i.e., 8,000 man-hours, and, based on this, the circular trench fortress of Wessex in southern England must have been constructed with 100,000 man-hours. The tombs of the chiefs in the Orkney Islands, built around 3300 BC, or the tomb of the chiefs in Germany, built around 600 BC, or the royal mound tomb in Gordion, Phrygia could have been built voluntarily by a few thousand members of the tribe in honour of their deceased leader. Meanwhile, the construction of a Neolithic henge required 1 million man-hours, the coordinated all-year-round work of 3,000 people, and the construction of Silbury Hill, created around 2800 BC, required as many as 18 million man-hours (Renfrew-Bahn, 1996: 190-191). The city of Jericho, close to the Mediterranean Sea, built in the 9-8th millennium BC featuring stone walls of several meters thick enclosing a four-hectare area, as well as an eight-meter- wide and two-metre-deep moat, and nine-meter-high towers, could only be built by its inhabitants through public works, because their society not only did not know writing and wage labour, but it was at least 7,000 years away from the use of minted money and sealed precious-metal means of payment used as currency by river valley civilizations were also launched only 5,000 years later. The chessboard-like, well-designed system of streets, blockhouses with sewer systems, temples and fortifications of the cities of Mohenjo-daro and Harappa in the Indus Valley could only be created and maintained by a strong and organized central will (Herzog, 1998: 20-21). The organised character of the thirty-two-acre town of Çatalhöyük in Anatolia in the sixth millennium BC showed a level of development that differed little from the conditions prevailing three thousand years later in the early Sumerian state boasting the use of writing, and the social organization of these cities went beyond the level of control of a simple village judge (Piggot, 1965: 27-28). These enormous products of human labour before the establishment of the state could not have been created and maintained by voluntary and poorly organized work alone.

These Neolithic community projects were implemented by public-work taxes based on the physical strength of the population. Even before crop taxes were levied, advanced civilizations of the era used the labour force of the population to build roads, canals, dams and for military service, as well as for the cultivation of arable land. The magnitude of the Mesopotamian tasks can be deduced from the fact that the inhabitants raised the ground level in their cities by several meters after each major flood and often rebuilt the sewer systems. This effort is recalled, with metaphorical conciseness, by a Babylonian inscription in which the ruler boasted that he had gathered his men, and: „I made them work with great strength and hade them transform the two banks of the channel into formidable mountains.” (Postgate, 1994: 182) The epic of Gilgamesh of Sumerian origin refers to the fact that the citizens of oppressed Uruk had to perform difficult and obligatory public work for their king (Oppenheim, 1977: 319). Looking back on an earlier period in history, these written evidences testify to the magnitude of the work carried out. Prehistoric structures showed the organizational and productive abilities of early communities and marked the limits of volunteering and spontaneous work in an era when the existence of a state in the modern sense could not yet be considered. It is not known where the borderline between volunteering and compulsory work ran, but it is certain that prehistoric cultures claimed part of the labour and time of individuals for the benefit of the group, because their needs could not be met otherwise in cities and tribes with a few tens of thousands of members. Public work carried out for the group can be defined as a prerequisite for prehistoric and ancient economic and political development, as no community goals could have been achieved without them. The cooperation of individuals not only created useful projects, but also established the order of work organization. Without this accumulated experience, it would have been inconceivable for Pharaoh Cheops to have the Great Pyramid of Giza built in the 26th century BC, which was accomplished with twenty years of work, using more than a hundred thousand workers and 4,000 skilled workers. Early written records not only describe the infrastructural development and investments of the emerging states, but also show the level the redistribution system of the Neolithic era reached before the establishment of the stateIn the wake of Mesopotamian traditions, ancient states also imposed labour-based taxes for the benefit of the state, taking the form of periodic compulsory agricultural and construction drudgery and military service (Jursa-Garcia, 2015: 130). Compulsory agricultural service was given a specific name in each culture. Among the Hittites, this tax was called „luzzi,” and in Arrapha (Djakonov, 1982: 53) and the Neo Assyrian Empire, and in Nuzi, it was called „ilku”, (Maidman, 2010: 80-82) depending on the legal status of the land cultivated, the workers performing the work, and the legal title to work. In some states, such as in Nuzi (Justel, 2020: 351-352) and the Middle Assyrian Empire (Donbaz, 2016: 19), taxes could be replaced by precious metals, and slaves or semi-free workers could receive food supplies in exchange for it (Renger, 1994: 171-172). Due to the fact that in irrigation agricultural systems only seasonal work, i.e. sowing, harvesting, flood protection required the participation of a large number of workers, labour obligation were predictable and plannable, and a broad strata of society was involved in them (Jursa-Garcia, 2015:120). In the Old Kingdom of Egypt, its rural population was used for public works and state constructions (Garcia, 2021: 316), while in most states of Mesopotamia, in addition to slaves and semi-freemen, who in the Mari kingdom were simply called field goers (Chambon, 2020: 255), freemen were also involved in occasional public works and agricultural production (Llop, 2020: 334).
In the Early Babylonian state, seasonal work was levied on communities, towns, villages alike (Jursa-Garcia, 2015: 128), and it was the head of the family or a village leader who appointed the person who actually performed the compulsory work. According to written records dating back to the 3rd – 2nd millennium BC, the amount of public work could reach up to 2-10 days per month per family, which was used as needed in agriculture or state construction. The withdrawal of six working days of a taxpayer’s monthly output, calculated from 70 to 120 working days for the whole year, meant a 30 percent tax on his workforce, but this burden was shared by the members of the family. In Babylon, in the second millennium BC, each family performed 48 to 120 compulsory working days a year to maintain irrigation systems (Djakonov, 1982). The ruler of Isin in Babylon, Lipit-Ishtar, was recorded to have called his subjects to public work only 6-10 days a month, which was a social innovation in that era. In other cultures, regulation may have been more burdensome. In China’s Shang kingdom, which primarily practised rainfed farming, farmers were required to work on the lands of the king or local landlord, and this practice formed the basis of the tax system for thousands of years (Campbell, 2021). The gravity of Chinese public works obligations imposed in the first millennium BC was indicated by the fact that two people from a peasant family of five were regularly assigned to official public work (Balázs, 1976: 46), which tormented the people to such extent that in many cases they refused to perform the work and fled (Huan, 1931 :96).
It also needs to be examined whether the public works obligation can be called a tax in a situation where none of the basic conditions needed for the establishment of financial systems in ancient cultures, i.e., the market, the use of money, the existence of permanent stratum of bureaucrats, the fair sharing of public burdens, and the personally free citizens, have been met. Despite the fact that these elements were undoubtedly missing, many researchers such as Weber (1979), Herzog (1998), Ellickson-Thorland (1995), Djakonov (1972), Szilovics (2022) defined compulsory work performed at prehistoric and ancient and sacral, defensive, and agricultural construction sites as taxes, because ancient communities exploited the individual’s ability to create value and limit the accumulation of wealth of persons in order to achieve their goals (Valk, 2021: 9). Irrespective of the practical form of work, the tax nature of this obligation is indisputable, because while the taxpayers worked in the interest of the group, they could not increase their personal wealth and by means of this work they paid the price of their security and helped their community. The imposition of taxes based on public works was necessitated by the fact that in this early phase of human culture, in the absence of markets, cash and personal wealth, taxation was limited to what the service capacity of community members provided, and these societies were able to ensure the performance of tasks even in the absence of a means of payment, legal norms and budget. Labour-based taxation was an immanent part of the life of ancient civilizations, since developments benefitting the whole community could not be financed in any other way, as members of the population forced to work could not donate part of their money and wealth to public purposes because they had little or no money. In this era, the labour force of the population proved to be the most reliable and easily mobilized social resource. It must also be seen that, that in terms of their content, it does not make a material difference whether an individual utilizes their labour force and pays a part of the consideration earned through their performance as a money tax to the central budget or offer their direct physical contribution to the performance of tasks defined by the authorities.

The Role of Leaders in the Emergence of Crop Taxes

In the last stages of prehistory, the settlement of people and the revolution of cities transformed Neolithic societies. The state of social and political equality ceased to exist, and cooperation in the life of groups was overshadowed by competition in many areas, and differences emerged in the wealth and community importance of individuals (De Laet, 1994: 366). In the 5th-4th millennium BC, in river valley societies, and in the second millennium BC, in rainfed (or dry farming) cultures, the imposition of certain forms of public burdens became regular, and their fulfilment meant recognition of power. This process of redistribution was controlled by the leaders of the groups from the beginning, and they could not charge a high price for their work due to the low level of surplus of the crop produced, because in this era only 1-3 times the seed sown was harvested, which was significantly lower than the 15-25 times level collected in the states created later (Jursa-Garcia, 2015: 118). The amount of surplus crops only made it possible to exempt the leaders from manual labour, who could then receive an equal share of the goods produced as the others. This system of labour relief so perfectly suited the financial means of many communities that this practice survived in the poorer tribes of America and Africa until as late as the 16th-18th centuries A.D. The Brazilian Guaraní and Tupi people cultivated the land of their chiefs for centuries, but their leaders “could not enjoy any advantage or other privilege in the distribution of the hunting prey.” (Beöthy, 1977a: 69) Some Andean peoples cultivated the land of the ruler first, followed by the land of orphans, widows, the sick and those at war, and finally to cultivated their own lands (Lánczy, 1977: 312). As the population grew, the organizing activities of elected leaders became more important, and they gradually took control of the storage and redistribution of goods collected and the organization of public works, for which they could collect gifts for themselves in tribes and cities with a population of a few thousands or ten thousands. They remained members of their community and shared the toils of economic life and the dangers of war with their fellows and followed the same customary law, and after they died, they were buried in a grave similar to that of their adherents, only into a larger and more ornate one (Renfrew-Bahn, 1996: 167-168). Chiefs during this period had no bureaucratic power and could only lead their communities because of their outstanding skills. Only those ones could become leaders who were brave in war, persuasive in council meetings, resourceful and cooperative in peacetime, and took into account the opinions of the organs of popular power.

In the centuries followed, due to the expansion of irrigation systems, the storage of surplus crops, the selection of plants, the development of tools, as well as the organization of trade, labour and social life, the efficiency of productive work improved and the surplus of crops steadily increased. A large part of the population realised that larger, richer, and better-governed communities have generally defeated smaller and more disorganized groups, and that more efficient production, plundering neighbours, and developing external relations can pay off for all. Nevertheless, members of the elite could only count on occasional gifts for their activities, but they could skim the modest profits of trade and crafts (Weber, 1979). The organization of public works and protection tasks, as well as the fact that it was them who performed the annual division of land, made their work more valuable and strengthened their influence, so that the management of people and cities became an independent task due to the problems of coexistence of a growing population. The activities of the leaders improved the quality of coexistence, increased the efficiency of agriculture and stimulated trade, so that they could demand an increasing share of the produce produced. In parallel with the increase in trade in goods and surpluses, it became more profitable to obtain religious and political leadership positions. The ever-more wealthy chiefs and members of boards sought to perpetuate their position of control and acquire some of the common goods. The early cultures were transformed by the fact that their leaders could turn their growing wealth into political advantages, their economic power into political positions, and control over an increasing share of community revenue. In the next phase of the spiral of domination, political and economic prerogatives were transformed into hereditary powers, despite the fact that relations of subordination between individuals had not yet been consolidated. In the last stage of prehistory, people „ lived in well-organized societies, and were accustomed to leadership, rules, taxes, obligations, etcetera” (Claessen, 2002: 105) This process was not recognized by the members of the group, they used the services of the authorities and followed the instructions that were advantageous to them, and during this period they became taxpayers almost imperceptibly. The leaders of prehistoric groups took care of the production, storage, distribution, external and internal safety of their community, the organization of constructions, and the support of the gods. However, local chiefs who controlled the communities on the lands of village communities and large families could not consider levying crop taxes for a long time because of the common system of land cultivation. Further economic and political changes were needed to introduce a regular crop tax.

In 5th – 4th millennium BC, the leaders of peoples engaged in irrigation farming, after organizing the coexistence of urban dwellers, were able to rely on their trade income, gifts from the community, and received a larger share of the booty of war, thus gaining a significant financial advantage over ordinary members of their community, extending control over the use of harvested crops and acquiring an increasing share of arable land. In exchange for the transfer of the plots that came into their possession, they initially asked for crop gifts, then regular rent, and finally permanent crop taxes. Ellis described the development of miksu, i.e., the Mesopotamian crop tax over the centuries similarly. According to him, this process took place after the establishment of the state, where the withdrawal of part of the crops resulted from the division of crops between the tenant and the landowner, then it first turned into a portion of the crop received in exchange for the cultivation of the palace estate, and finally into an ordinary tax (Ellis, 1974). This process probably began even before the creation of the first states, when members of the influential and wealthy elite acquired tax-free or conquered lands and began buying up common land. Archaeological records indicate that even before the establishment of states, secular and clergy elites transformed community property relations and created a differentiated system of lands, and when states were formed, the production role of royal, cleric and palace lands as well as those of rich private estates was decisive, a situation that could not have developed without antecedents. This is also indicated by the fact that in Egypt, during the first dynasties, the hwt system already covered the country and organized production, and 15-20% of the country’s grain production was produced or collected there (Jursa-Garcia, 2015).

In Mesopotamia, as early as at the beginning of statehood, temples and palace farms had an advantage in land tenure, and the deities ruling over the cities became the largest landowners, while the proportion of family land decreased. This suggests that in North African and the proto-Asian cultures (i.e., the proto-states of China, Mesopotamia and Europe), land communities owned by large families and clans began to decay simultaneously with the strengthening of prehistoric states and cities. As early as the fourth millennium BC, the more efficient production of larger farms put small farmers at a disadvantage, and part of their land became the property of wealthy individuals and institutions before the creation of states (Jursa-Garcia, 2015:119). The financial situation of the owners of community lands had been eroded centuries earlier by significant differences in their farming opportunities and the unequal distribution of public work obligations among members, whereby wealth stratification emerged within the community, and domestic land communities in the Eastern Mediterranean region were pushed into the background over the millennia due to accumulated shareholder loans and the departure of some owners (Djakonov, 1972).
The process of concentration of land wealth did not stop after the creation of states, as reported by numerous sources. Written records of Urukagina in the 24th century BC and Hammurappi in the 19th century BC, as well as fragments of Jewish codes dating back to the 1st millennium BC, testify to the centuries-long struggle in which the hereditary order of royal and clan farms came into conflict with the principles of developing private property. In Assyria, by the middle of the second millennium BC, a significant part of the members of the land community had been freed from their burdens, passing them on to the poorest members, and merged with the privileged class of royal employees. It is revealing that the Code of Lipit-Istar specifically regulated the public service obligations of single men who had separated from the land community and their families. This legal option indirectly proves the disintegration of land communities. This is evidenced by the fact that the 3rd-2nd millennium BC., the estate of ordinary families in the administrative unit of Bau averaged 0.37-1.15 acres, while officials, servants of God, could farm on average 16.3 acres. In Lagas, more than twenty gods owned estates, and the wife of one of the chief gods owned 4203 hectares, 75% of which was distributed among families and small tenants, and the tribal god acquired the largest chunk of the clan lands (Djakonov, 1972). The aim of the elite did not change after seizing power, and they sought to acquire as much of the arable land as possible, limit the land market and collect regular crop taxes on their estates. In Ur, during the reign of the Third Dynasty, much of the land was under the control of the state’s ruling elite (Renger, 1994: 188), while the royal administration attempted to extend its control to other households and institutional farmers (Jursa-Garcia, 2015: 122-123). At the end of the 3rd millennium BC, most of the country’s land was controlled and taxed by an elite loyal to the court (Garfinkle, 2021). In Larsa, one third of the arable land of the village communities was managed by the royal palace and church, where workers dependent in their person were employed. In Larsa, one third of the arable land of the village communities was managed by the royal palace and church, where workers dependent in their person were employed (Kosyreva, 1988).

In some states of Mesopotamia, the market for agricultural land was also restricted. In the northern part of the region, there was a lively land market and the sale of arable land is well demonstrated. In contrast, in the south, the sale of arable land was exceptional. Of the 800 contracts for the sale of real estate from the Early Babylonian period, only 250 came from the southern cities and 13 of them concerned the sale of small parcels (Renger, 1994: 186). In this region, the free market circulation of land was restricted and they could only change owners if they were burdened with service obligations (D’Alfonso-Matessi, 2021: 134). If someone wanted to cultivate land or build within the city, they could ask permission from the priests of the temple. In Mittani, it was explicitly forbidden to sell land because it belonged to the king. In Nuzi, only a few long-standing privately owned lands could be acquired through fictitious adoption transactions, a legal act that probably replaced lease (Fincke, 2010). The dissolution of independent agricultural units in Old Babylonian times was due to indebtedness due to harvest loans, which led to insolvency and the sale of pawn lands or debt slavery, resulting in social unrest and instability, whereby entire populations of some villages left their homes to escape the debt trap (Renger, 1994: 197).

In addition to the concentration of wealth and power, the ownership structure of land holdings was transformed by frequent political and power struggles, because every conquest and throne feud was followed by land distribution, and former landowners were often expelled (Chambon, 2020). Most of the conquered lands became the property of the king, who donated the abandoned landholdings to people loyal to him or established farming colonies from the defeated people where the lands were burdened with heavy services (Campbell, 2021:51). This practice of settling manpower could have been observed throughout much of antiquity in Anatolia (Marston, 2012: 393), Persia and India. It is known that in the Old Babylonian period, cities conquered and placed under direct royal administration were inhabited by large masses of subjugated workers and small tenants (Jursa-Garcia, 2015: 127). It became common practice to differentiate taxation according to the legal status of people, and the amount of tax payable was determined based on the status of the taxpayer or the legal status of the land he cultivated (Chambon, 2020). Ethnically and politically transformed communities developed a multi-layered tax system, in which land donated by the king to the elite was often tax-free and most of the crop taxes were paid by servants of royal lands, as well as deportees and prisoners of war (D’Alfonso-Matessi, 2021).
After the elimination of the political role and bargaining position of the land communities, weakened by internal and external difficulties, the possibility of secular and clergy aristocracy to dispose of land was further strengthened, because they had to reckon only with the limited ability of small tenants and servant peoples to assert their interests. Following the rearrangement of property relations, a new system of public burdens emerged, where tenants of royal and priestly farms were subject to regular crop taxes; the first written proof of it comes from Babylon dating back to the 19th century BC (Ellis, 1974: 212). During the long existence of the Babylonian Empire, crop taxes were continuously levied, the name of which, the basis of taxation, the manner in which they were levied and fulfilled followed social and economic changes. In the Early Babylonian Empire, miksu initially meant a general share for the palace levied on agricultural and commercial activities, which in the Middle Empire era became a crop tax levied on agricultural production collected for the central administration (Ellis, 1974: 243). In the Neo-Babylonian period, miksu as a crop tax was pushed into the background and replaced by special taxes on specific groups of products (Ellis, 1974). Despite the slow changes over the centuries, this type of tax was levied in all states of the region. In the Mari kingdom, this tax was called sibsum or miksum (Chambon, 2020: 249), in the Hittite legal system the crop tax levied on family estates was called luzzi, in case of the tenants of state lands it was called sahhan, i.e. harvest tax (Marazzi, 2008: 64-65), and among the Egyptians the harvest tax on smallholders and temple farms was called semu (Jursa-Garcia, 2015: 145-14

On the Balance of Public Services and Community Contributions

If it is accepted that the introduction of prehistoric taxes did not require a state or a law enforcement organization, then it must also be reviewed why the people of the Neolithic era fulfilled the obligations imposed by their community. Their cooperation was partly based on the hidden compulsion of local customary law, the violation of which entailed the risk of becoming an outcast. More importantly, even in prehistoric times, the threat of violence could not ensure the long-term fulfilment of obligations, therefore a mutually beneficial agreement was reached between the individual and representatives of power on the exchange of services. As a result of the fact that people were governed by leaders or bodies prominent in the community without law enforcement organizations or apparatuses, who had no means of enforcing services by force, they had to seek goals that would benefit all members when levying labour-based taxes. People forced to work and provide gifts expected leaders who established their obligations to take care of their needs (Klenger, 1972: 169). The statement related to ancient states was also true for prehistoric societies: „Tax systems reflected moral and social contracts between individuals and the king, allowing everyone, regardless of social status, to access resources and advance up the social ladder.” (Chambon, 2020: 272) Neolithic people fulfilled the obligations expected of a tribe or group, and therefore benefited from the material and social benefits of their community’s operation and realized that the basis of the functioning of their society was a balance of services between leaders and those being lead. On one side of the settlement were the common taxpayers, who cooperated with the power governing the people because they recognized the usefulness of the services provided by the leaders and the community as a whole: protection from external and internal attacks and starvation, receiving their share from common goods and favour of the gods, as well as the food, spoils of war and hunting produced, and participation in collective decision-making. They expected their leaders to do and organize on their behalf all the work that they could not accomplish individually or could only have accomplished with disproportionate effort and unpredictability. On the other side of the agreement were representatives of power, whose activities, regardless of the geographical location of their people, their ethnic and cultural background, were guided by the same moral commandments. They could rely upon the loyalty of their subjects if they governed justly and mercifully and at least formally sought to serve the common good by their actions. In prehistoric tribes and groups, the system of expectations for leaders was formed before the formation of states, and the creation of the first states was made possible exactly by the recognizable usefulness of leadership work for everyone.

In the states established in the 4th – 3rd millennium BC, the principles of cooperation and solidarity developed during the horde era during the distribution of hunting spoils and the first defensive constructions continued to exist. By means of these agreements, kings, using the expertise of officials, could organize society (Valk, 2021: 19-20) and centralize and redistribute surplus even more efficiently than any previous local farmers or chiefs (Childe, 1958: 94-95). The leaders of the ancient states continued to strive to achieve voluntary fulfilment of the subordinate and hide the means of coercion, as well as to preserve the internal order of the population (Valk, 2021: 20). The Mesopotamian, Sumerian, Akkadian, Hittite codices equivocally emphasized that the king was interested in the welfare of their subjects (Oppenheim, 1977: 289), and Hammurabi, the Assyrian Tukuli-Ninurta I and Tiglath-Pileser III appeared as good shepherds ruling their people. The task of the ruler was defined in Hammurabi’s code of laws engraved in basalt as follows: „The gods Anu and Enlil have always addressed me the benefactor of my people: I am Hammurabi, the only faithful ruler on earth, who punishes sinners and evils and prevents the strong from oppressing the weak” (Roth, 1997: 77). According to Early Babylonian inscriptions, leaders sought to gain the cooperation of taxpayers and maintain their security (Valk, 2021). The kings of Mesopotamia protected the oppressed and made laws to help the people (Oppenheim, 1977: 141), not forgetting that their income ultimately depended on their subjects. On several occasions they forgave the accumulated tax debts of the population (Kraus, 1958) and returned the pledged and lost land in order to gain the favour of their subjects. The temples in Babylon established a uniform system of weights and measures to prevent deception of the inhabitants, occasionally lending loans to those in need at interest rates and welcoming the children of the hungry during famine. The kings of Mesopotamia protected the oppressed and made laws to help the people, not forgetting that their income ultimately depended on their subjects. On several occasions they cancelled the accumulated tax debts of the population and returned the pledged and lost land in order to gain the favour of their subjects (Ellickson-Thorland, 1995: 374). The temples in Babylon established a uniform system of weights and measures to prevent deception of the inhabitants, occasionally disbursed loans to those in need at zero interest and provided shelter for the children of the hungry during famine (Oppenheim, 1977: 146).

Palace farms in Mesopotamia often provided collaborators with land, seeds, draught animals, ploughs, and labour to grow grain, which were accounted for only after harvest (Renger, 1994: 173). In Egypt, some of the produce was collected in state warehouses, which were used to feed those performing state duties to provide a livelihood for them if they participated in state construction projects, expeditions, the army, or seasonal work. In doing so, they supported the official ideology, centred on the Pharaoh caring for his people (Jursa-Garcia, 2015: 142). This attitude could be observed among many peoples who were distant from one another in terms of geographical location and time of existence. In the tribal states of prehistoric China, the leader was called the Son of Heaven (Balázs, 1976: 29), who received his commission from the gods and was „meant to represent the interests of the people, to be a benevolent father, to rule as the supreme head of the family” and therefore he had many sacred duties to help the life of society, who received his commission from the gods and was „called to represent the interests of the people, to be a benevolent father, to rule as the supreme head of the family” and therefore had many sacred duties to help the life of society (Maspero, 1965: 128). In ancient India, those on power had the duty to ensure peace and order and protect people (Sanjeev, 2016: 4-5). The king could collect taxes only because he acted in the interest of his subjects, and the preservation of welfare and public order was defined as a means of legitimizing power. „The State must operate rationally and the interest of the State must be secured by pursuing the public interest” (Sanjeev, 2016: 3). These principles appeared in the Code of Manu, as well as in the Mahabharata and the Ramayana. According to Early Indic sources, the Maurya dynasty and the people made an agreement: „the king received the tax not as the owner of the lands, but as the sovereign of the state, who is the protector of the country’s population” and „if the ruler collects taxes without protecting his subjects, he goes to hell.” Such a king was called the „thief of one-sixth of the crop” (Antonova-Bongard-Levin-Kotovsky, 1981: 71). In Europe, the system of redistribution of Mycenaean culture, operating in the 2nd millennium BC, was also characterized by mutual exchange, where the ruler occasionally helped people cooperating with the center with draught animals and ewes (Nakassis, 2021). In Israel, in the first millennium BC, „Herod made sure to seem like a ruler caring for his people seriously. In times of need, he sent 50,000 reapers out into the country to help, and he took care of the feeding of these workers. He cared for the needy and distributed food,” and in hard years he forgave one-third of the taxes due (Flavius, 1980). According to Finley’s perception, the Greek and Roman citizens living in the first millennium BC expected their leaders to provide „a sense of identification with the group, a sense of order, security, freedom, and even life itself, made possible by existing regulations and institutions. They expected, or at least desired and hoped for some degree of help in crises situations when their livelihood was jeopardised” (Finley, 1983). According to Clark, the leaders of the ancient Roman tax administration even reviewed what compensation they could provide people in exchange for fulfilling their tax obligations (Clark, 2017: 1). Even as late as the nineteenth century A.D., the balance of public services and community contributions among African Mandingos was taken so seriously that the amount of taxes paid by the tribe depended on the king’s personal popularity (Beöthy, 1977b: 76).
The Effect of Food Supply and the Organization of Production on the Emergence of Taxes

The primary task of prehistoric leaders was to provide sufficient food for all members of the group, which was important because these people lived in unpredictable circumstances where „hunting and gathering conditions were constantly changing due to animal migration and weather changes” (Lloyd, 2021: 20). Members of the horde were „often malnourished and, for constant fear of starvation, devoted much of their labour directly to seeking food” (Clark, 1948: 38) and believed that periods of abundance and scarcity varied according to the favour of the gods which was influenced by the intercession of tribal leaders with magical abilities and the sacrificial gifts of the community. These ceremonies held the members of the group together and helped establish leadership dominance (Clark, 1948: 41). Participation in sacred events and meals reminded everyone that without his companions, given the unpredictability of hunting and gathering, it was difficult for them to survive. Belonging to a group meant that the individual had regular access to the necessary food, and eating the prey together multiplied the chances of survival. In prehistoric times, every meal became a symbol of tribal and clan cohesion and of service and community contribution between power and subjects. The fair distribution of available food was treated as a moral issue, and its rules may have differed in different groups, but there were principles accepted by all. Each member of the group got their share of the spoils of the others, and everyone submitted to the decision of the leaders and the community (Clark, 1948: 68). It was accepted that the women provided plant-based food, but they also received their share of meat, and everyone made sure that there was enough food for those lower in rank as well. Each individual shared the fate of the group because „in prehistoric societies the economic system was organized in such a way that no individual was threatened with starvation. Their place at the campfire and their share of the common supplies were secured for them, whatever role they played in hunting, grazing, farming” (Polányi, 1976: 131). This meant that the selfish and short-term interests of individuals were preceded by the principles of community cohesion and solidarity, because this was the only means for most group members to escape starvation. It was important in the development of taxation that the prehistoric distribution practice based on group solidarity introduced community thinking and the importance of community agreements was learned. If anyone violated the well-known laws of honour, generosity, and the transfer of goods, they were expelled from the group. People recognized that social coexistence is based on reciprocity, which benefits everyone, and as early as during the millennia of the hordes they realised the advantages of systems operating on the principle of public service and community contributions, that is, that the reward of individual generosity was so great that it was not worth engaging in any behaviour other than altruism (Polányi, 1976: 55). The members realized that solidarity can pay off in the long run and therefore it is worth offering their acquired goods to the group so that they too can later share in the spoils of others. They understood that acts of service and contributions could be separated in time without losing their benefits to people. They learned that cooperation can be a means of survival for all who follow general moral rules. This thinking that went beyond short-term interests made the later development of public burden-sharing possible and formed the theoretical basis of voluntary compliance during redistribution. The balanced supply of food, the reserve of collected goods and the organization of agriculture were social and economic innovations that made the usefulness of power palpable in the everyday life of the population. The positive effect of cooperative behaviour was strengthened by the common consumption of spoils, and in many cultures, even before the formation of states, voluntary gifts, forced labour and crop taxes were provided to leaders and food was collected in warehouses. The organization of food supply in prehistoric societies was not simply an act of satisfying vital functions, but a uniting act of community (D’Alfonso-Matessi, 2021). This is indicated by the fact that large community granaries and warehouses were unearthed by archaeologists in the prehistoric cities of Jericho, Çatalhöyük, Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa.

The population of the ancient states created centuries later also accepted that the organization of food supply was the responsibility of those in power (Valk, 2021: 20). „Sharing in food reinforced the awareness that being a subject of the empire meant more than cultivating state lands or fighting in distant wars” (Renfrew-Bahn, 1996: 206). In many regions of the ancient world, even thousands of years after the disappearance of ancient cultures, the practice of the eating the meat offered as sacrifices at public expense together by the population survived, and many offered their gifts cooked or baked for this reason. In Mesopotamia, provincial governments and temple farms took turns collecting the produce and animals prescribed by the center for sacral purposes (Jursa-Garcia, 2015: 125). At the end of the fourth millennium BC, Arslantepe near the Upper Euphrates used the food collected for communal feasts and food distribution (Frangipane, 2012; D’Anna, 2015). In the Mari kingdom, vassals and senior officials and high-ranking persons gathered annually to celebrate the feast of the goddess Estar and personally present their gifts to the king and express their obedience (Chambon, 2020: 270-271). The main activity of the Mycenaean administration, operating in the 2nd millennium BC, was the organization of large-scale community feasts, which gave the palace the opportunity to show generosity and promote social solidarity (Nakassis, 2021: 107). In the 5th century B.C., the convening of the Ithaca assembly had long been forgotten, but the practice of eating together with the tribe survived, and in Attica the state offered financial subsidy in order to put meat on the tables of the poor at major festivals (Polányi, 1984: 128). Feeding the people at regular feasts for the people was a practice that was part of the toolbox of many later powers. It was used in Athens as well as in the Roman Empire, where the people were provided with free food, flour, oil, bread and meat, and occasionally cash (Fronto, 1998: 258-259). The provision of food supplies forced early states to stockpile considerable stocks, so they continued to build large storehouses to ensure the safety of community consumption. Temple and palace farms in Mesopotamia also stockpiled food and grain reserves, which were not used for commercial purposes in the 3rd millennium BC and they were occasionally distributed free of charge to needy residents (Djakonov, 1982: 80). The Hittite Empire, centred around Anatolia, pursuing rainfed farming, stored huge quantities of grain that exceeded the needs of the population, which were used as food and seed reserves. The smaller storage facilities were used for cult consumption by the population. An important task of the Hittite cities was to accumulate and redistribute food necessary for state-religious events, from which farmers also benefited and ate jointly on holidays. The king often o took part in these events, too (D’Alfonso-Matessi, 2021).
It was decisive for the development of taxation as early as in prehistoric times a part of the population ceded the provision of food to their leaders and accepted the obedience resulting from the transfer of this responsibility. This was alluded to by an early Egyptian inscription. „You hold the pen; rule is your responsibility” (Childe, 1962: 96-97) Agriculture led by leaders produced more efficiently because it was based on knowledge that was exclusively owned by the elite. Priests and secular leaders of prehistoric and ancient cultures, as well as Egyptian, Chinese, and later Inca officials, also told farmers when to start agricultural work, how much seed was needed for the land, and when rivers would flood, and in some empires even seed was distributed from central warehouses and to farming communities. As a result of this task, community leaders often emerged as farmers who effectively helped their people. In Egypt, Pharaohs controlled agricultural production and watched the flooding of the Nile, and as the country’s first farmer, carried out the first hoeing and harvested the first ear of crop. “the ruler is the nourisher of the country, providing for the people, sparing them from hunger, poverty, and violence. He was the Sun God, and everyone lives under his guidance and shares in wealth” (Schneider, 2004: 325). The welfare of the people depended on the intercession of Pharaoh (Clark, 1975: 220). In Neolithic China, the agricultural year was initiated by the king’s holy sacrifice, and the ruler, as the country’s leading farmer, ploughed the first furrow every year and sacrificed animals for abundant harvests, and „had a constant duty to monitor the state of production” (Maspero, 1965: 51). Shang rulers made the oracles predict crop yields every year and controlled agriculture, prayed for a bountiful harvest, and set planting and harvesting times (Campbell, 2021). The sacral role of Chinese emperors was so deeply entrenched in society that even as late as in the nineteenth century A.D. the emperor felt responsible for the natural calamities that befell the country, prayed regularly for rain and, in the event of failure to produce it, even published a contrite statement in the Beijing gazette (Dennis, 1876: 125). For thousands of years, many cultures believed that their rulers could influence nature. even as late as the 19th century AD, the African Kaffirs believed that the chief was the father of the people, the source of all goods who provided for the welfare of the tribe: “He is the chalice the country drinks from to nourish herself”. „He is the chalice from which the country drinks and nourishes itself” (Beöthy, 1882: 43) The same belief prevailed among the African Bongo people and the rural tribes of the White Nile, where the king was primarily responsible for the welfare of his community and for communing with the supporting gods. As a result, the leader, who was sacrificed for the sake of the community if he was deemed unfit to rule (Beöthy, 1882, 122-1A review of the principles of food production and distribution has revealed some important factors for the development of taxation. The first of them is that solidarity was a fundamental feature of the functioning of ancient communities, which developed during the distribution of scarce resources and existed as a millennia-old practice which offers a preview of tax payment and responsibility for the community prevailing to this day. This prehistoric model made it possible, in the next stage of social development, to request people not only to give up or donate part of their prey captured, but also to hand over some of their food produced in the form of crop taxes and take part in public works. Acknowledging the leader’s role in distributing food and maintaining order, local leaders were supported by food donations and labour relief. The provision of food to the community and its fair distribution have been the main means of legitimizing power and laying the foundation for the formation of tax systems for millennia up until to present day. For the early communities, it was important to follow a leader who took responsibility for his people and was able to provide for the people entrusted to him with his knowledge and wealth.

The Role of Security and Stability in Cooperation Between Taxpayers and Power

An early function of power was to organize defence against external enemies, because in prehistoric and ancient agricultural societies the principle of ‘security comes first’ prevailed (Posner, 1980), and stability was preferred to taking risk and chaos (Valk, 2021). The first human groups formed a community for the very reason of forming defensive cooperation, as well as for practicing religious ceremonies and providing mutual assistance (Morgan, 1907: 222), and built structures of defence to restrain external enemies as early as 8th- 5th centuries BC. millennium, on the territory of Mersin, Hacilar and Jericho (Herzog, 1998: 59). In the Middle Eastern states, from the third millennium BC on, every city had a fortress and city walls, and it was the duty of the king to maintain them. The size and condition of the defensive structures were a striking proclamation of the economic and political power of the cities (Oppenheim, 1977: 169-170). The importance of security was also indicated by the fact that in prehistoric groups only those could be leaders who were at the forefront of combat. Many peoples assumed a relationship between the physical condition of the ruler and his ability to defend himself and expected their leader to occasionally demonstrate his physical strength to his subjects at certain ceremonies. In Egypt, on the 30th anniversary of the king’s accession to the throne he was required to prove that he was fit to rule and physically capable of directing the defence of the country and leading the army (Willeitner, 2004: 453). The practice of ritual killing of the king in many cultures can also be traced back to this social expectation. Among the steppe peoples, the replacement or murder of ageing or incapable leaders prevailed until the end of the 1st millennium BC, while the ritual killing of the king of the Yoruba people, was part of their customary law until the 19th century AD.

In more advanced civilizations, states, tribes, city-states, personal protection was supplemented by property protection, and taxpayers expected their leaders to ensure undisturbed possession of family or personal property. In Egypt, the ruler took action against illegal confiscations and illegal taxes, as well as other frauds that harmed citizens. He proclaimed, „Don’t move the scales, don’t change the weights” (Murnane, 1995: 238). His care also extended to taxpayers’ capacity to bear the burden. According to literary texts, Pharaoh followed the principle: „Do not cripple the farmer with taxes, let him live well and he will be there for you next year as well” (Jursa-Garcia, 2015: 153-154). In the Hittite kingdom, the conditions of taxation affecting certain social groups were formulated in twenty-five sections of the Code (D’Alfonso-Matessi, 2021: 132-133). In Mesopotamia in the 2nd millennium BC, royal officials weighed and sealed silver money bags used for payment and authenticated them with their seals for public trust (Vargyas, 2010: 86).

In Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Greek poleis, the preservation of property was considered so important that official records of real estate were kept for protection and tax purposes. In Egypt, all land sale transactions were registered, with the assistance of local committees and witnesses (Ellickson-Thorland, 1995: 384). In Mesopotamia, in the middle of the 3rd BC, state officials, house surveyors, and land clerks were responsible for registering real estate (Foster, 1994). Land surveyors were also included in the oldest Mesopotamian historical records, and from the end of the 3rd millennium onwards, survey maps were engraved on clay tablets. In the Greek poleis in the first millennium BC, registration systems protecting the rights of owners were established, where owners were protected by legal guarantees against expropriation of their property and their citizens were promised that their property would be protected under all circumstances (Harris, 2015: 116).

On the Role of Sacrality

Of the services provided by the leaders, the need for sacral protection jointly provided by the gods and rulers excelled. Prehistoric people saw their leaders as ones capable of contacting the gods and through their support they could positively influence the lives of their people and turn to the upper powers in order to pursue successful hunting or increase crop averages. The people who controlled the ceremonies met such an important community need that they were exempted from participating in hunting and received a share of the surplus produce. These rites explained the world and made the individuals more confident (Childe, 1959). The cult of gods developed in every culture, and the person of social mediators became permanent. Initially, the shamans then, in the era of tribal societies, the political leaders became the people’s commissioners who kept in touch with the gods. This activity led to the fact that after a while the ruler was no longer just a mediator, but also became a god himself, performing his duties rigidified into rites for the welfare of the community. This belief was preserved and nurtured even after the formation of states. In Egypt, Pharaohs were considered the earthly ambassadors of the gods. „The main reason why the people supported the kingdom was the personal relationship between the king and the gods. This relationship was used by the king for the good of the country, who in turn worked hard and paid taxes, and this reciprocity ensured the welfare of the country” (Wilson, 1999: 247). They maintained the pretence that Pharaoh was the high priest of the country and that only he could offer temple sacrifices that could ensure successful agricultural production, and the reliefs depicted him alone offering sacrifices to the gods or performing manual labour. Even in the proto-Asian cultures (i.e., the proto-states of China, Mesopotamia and Europe), the king presented himself before the gods as a representative of the community, and his power rested on the fact that the gods guaranteed inner peace and stability through his person. Therefore, they were responsible for the welfare of their people and were obliged to perform their sacred duties. Shrines were built and maintained, and after successful campaigns, the spoils of war or the results of productive labour were distributed to the gods who lived in the shrines (Oppenheim, 1977: 148), as the tax was considered a gift of gratitude for the survival of the city. If a king fulfilled his duties incorrectly or did not keep the basic values, the gods turned away from the people and he could lost his legitimacy (Jursa-Garcia, 2015: 115-116). When the city of Lagas was defeated, the inhabitants blamed the clan goddess Nisaba (Djakonov, 1972: 211). The foreign occupation of the city of Babylon was attributed by the Babylonian poets to the fact that god Marduk abandoned their people (Oppenheim, 1977: 196). The support of gods was considered important even several millennia later. The Hittites gave generous gifts and sacrifices to the gods and kings, and in exchange for this the king ensured the welfare of society and achieving social cohesion was also an important goal (D’Alfonso-Matessi, 2021: 149-150).

The Role of Individual Interest in Legal Compliance

In addition to the principles of cooperation presented so far, the pursuit of individual interests must also be recognized in fulfilling prehistoric and ancient tax obligations and services, as the actions of the people of that era were not only motivated by solidarity and compliance with their status in the group, but also by their personal interests. They believed that their assigned duties were not only for the benefit of the gods, king, or community, but also for the enhancement of personal prosperity and financial situation. They paid taxes and worked in the fields, built forts and irrigation systems in the desert because they believed they would get something for their achievements. The Egyptian pharaohs, as representatives of the gods on earth, demanded unconditional obedience, but the work done for them was also a service to the gods, which helped maintain order in the world and thus supported the life of the individuals (Herzog, 1998: 85). The teams of pyramid builders, whose headcount was sometimes as many as a hundred thousand, worked diligently partly because they received regular supplies, but also because they hoped that as a result of their work, they could follow their master into immortality (Stadelmann, 2004: 73). The Egyptian commoners were motivated by the compulsion of central authority, religious commitment and self-interest to carry out public works. In Mesopotamia, where most of the land was owned by priests, „the interest of the community was often referred to as a reason for the obligation to fulfil for the benefit of the temple” (Herzog, 1998: 39) and „obedience was regarded by the people of Mesopotamia as a civilizational obligation just as much as the worship of the gods” (Oppenheim, 1977: 143). The undisturbed maintenance and servicing of power created predictability and relative prosperity for the majority, which justified cooperation with it. After the establishment of states, the social situation changed to the extent that direct violence was a stronger motivation for those who wavered than voluntary compliance resulting from the above insight, as those who failed to cultivate their land properly, did not participate in the construction of fortresses, or escaped from military recruitment were punished, exiled and often even killed by the leaders. Refusal to provide labour services led to the loss of livelihood and social status of the family. The examples presented prove that prehistoric and ancient people accepted the deal, cooperated with their ruler, whereby they could become full-fledged members of the community. During military service or work on construction sites, everyone could recognize the extent of their individual contribution and personal role in the life of the tribe or city-state, and also assess the benefits provided to them by the gods and the ruler. They had two possible options to choose from: either get involved in public works, military service and compulsory crop delivery, as well as gifts, i.e.: fulfilling tax obligations, and supporting the gods, or get exposed to total exclusion, life outside the community and almost certain annihilation. In this system, the labour force of an individual and the security of existence guaranteed by power and the support of the gods formed the basis of exchange necessary for social balance.

Conclusions

This study used the work of archaeologists and historians to review the process of the formation of the first taxes and found that the economic and political development of mankind in the Neolithic era also saw the emergence of the first taxes. In this early period, some human groups were able to use the physical strength of their inhabitants to create protective and sacral structures and irrigation systems with taxes based on public works, and then, taking away part of the benefits of the improved agricultural production in the form of crop taxes and occasional gifts, they were able to achieve their social goals even in the absence of administration, budget, currency or written legal order, thus paving the way to the creation of states. It is a mistake to attribute the emergence of the first states solely to royal power and insensitive exploitation of the economy and people, and to unlimited violence. The gradual development of human communities, in which power was limited by the common sense of people and community solidarity, as well as by the division of labour and the exchange of services, seems more likely. The early cultures under review owed their success and the creation of the first states to the fact that their leaders cooperated with members of the local elite and society as a whole and recognized that populations could only be forced to cooperate by force for a short time and with little efficiency (Garfinkle, 2021). The first states and tax systems emerged as a result of long and gradual development under the influence of changes in the material environment and economic and social order, and trust and pursuit of mutual interests were an important operating principle of developed ancient and ancient societies (Jursa-Garcia, 2015: 122). When analysing solidarity and cooperation in early civilizations, the aim was not to present an idealized account of peoples’ lives or history, but to present the most important individual and group motivations leading to the development of taxation. At the same time, it has to be kept in mind that the threat of social degradation and violence was constantly present in the lives of these communities, and the plundering and enslavement of neighbouring peoples seemed to be a courageous and desirable act in most cultures. Perhaps it was the very presence of palpable everyday violence the reason why the people of prehistory and antiquity longed for a predictable and secure existence, and this is why they were ready to make their material and personal sacrifices.

It must also be seen that it was inherent in taxation as a cultural phenomenon that the first taxes were not levied at the same time and in the same form in different societies. This is evidenced by the fact that communities, depending on their economic and political capabilities, created the first large-scale projects, chieftains’ graves, fortresses, cities, irrigation systems at different times. In crops based on rainfed and irrigated agricultural production, taxation developed in two completely different ways. Peoples with inefficient rainfed agriculture developed a different political and fiscal system compared to the alluvial cultures due to the natural constraints of smallholder production, the low level and accumulation rate of crop surpluses, and the slower-growing and territorially dispersed population. In these cultures of Europe and East Asia and Anatolia, full-fledged members of society were primarily warriors and their leaders could only occasionally rely on taxes and gifts based on public works, and introduced crop taxes centuries later compared to other civilisations, and their trade relations developed more slowly, too. These individualistic civilizations based on small estates and free warriors slowly gained strength, but they cooperated with the developed ancient states for several centuries and adopted all the operating principles and economic tools useful to them, whereby, by the first millennium BC they had accumulated so much surplus value, social drive and economic and organizational experience that they were able to conquer the exemplary Eastern societies.

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Dr. Csaba Szilovics PhD Professor
Head of Department, University of Pécs, Faculty of Law,
Department of Financial and Business Law